G. E. Moore

Quick Facts

• Full name: George Edward Moore
• Lived: 1873-1958
• Place: England, mostly Cambridge
• Main fields: ethics, epistemology, metaphysics, philosophy of perception
• Best known for: common-sense realism, the open question argument, the naturalistic fallacy, and the "Here is one hand" proof
• Major works: Principia Ethica, "A Defence of Common Sense," "Proof of an External World"

The Big Question

Moore kept asking two linked questions:

What do we know so securely that philosophy should not casually throw it away? And in ethics, can "good" really be defined as pleasure, desire, usefulness, or any other ordinary fact?

His answer was plain but disruptive. We know many ordinary things before we accept any theory: that we have bodies, that other people exist, that the earth existed before our birth, and that some acts are better than others.

In One Minute

G. E. Moore was one of the early makers of analytic philosophy. He helped turn British philosophy away from sweeping idealist systems and toward close analysis of clear, particular claims.

He is famous for defending common sense. By "common sense," Moore did not mean prejudice or whatever most people happen to believe. He meant very basic things we normally know without needing a philosophical theory: "I have two hands," "there are other people," "the past existed," and "the world contains physical objects."

In ethics, Moore argued that "good" cannot be defined as pleasure, desire, social approval, survival value, or any other natural property. A natural property is a feature that can be described by ordinary science or experience, such as being pleasant, causing happiness, or being wanted. Moore thought goodness is real, but not identical with any of those facts.

What They Taught

Moore taught that philosophy should start from things we know better than we know most theories. If a clever argument says no external world exists, Moore asks: is that argument really more certain than the fact that I have hands, that there are tables and trees, and that other people lived before me?

This is common-sense realism. "Realism" here means that many things exist independently of our thinking about them. A chair does not become real because someone is conscious of it. Moore did not claim that common sense solves every puzzle. He claimed that a theory which denies obvious things carries a heavy burden of proof.

Moore used this approach against idealism. The idealists he opposed often treated reality as mind-like or dependent on experience. Moore argued that they blurred two things: the act of experiencing and the object experienced. If you see a yellow patch, your seeing is one thing and the yellow patch is another. The fact that you experience something does not show that the thing is made of your experience.

His most famous example came in "Proof of an External World." Moore held up one hand, then the other. If these hands exist, then at least two external objects exist. So an external world exists. The point was not that skepticism can be defeated by a slogan. The point was that a proof can start from ordinary knowledge.

In ethics, Moore's main target was reduction. A reduction says that one kind of thing is really just another kind of thing. Someone might say, "good means pleasant," or "good means what people desire." Moore thought these theories confuse what things are good with what the word "good" means.

His open question argument makes the point. Suppose someone defines good as pleasure. It still makes sense to ask, "Pleasure is pleasant, but is it good?" Because that remains a real question, Moore says "good" and "pleasant" cannot mean exactly the same thing.

Moore called the mistake the naturalistic fallacy. In his use, this means defining "good" as a natural feature, such as pleasure, desire, biological fitness, or social approval. It does not mean nature is bad. It means goodness itself is not identical with any natural fact.

Moore's own view is often called ethical non-naturalism. "Non-natural" means that goodness is not discoverable in the same way we discover weight, brain chemistry, or voting patterns. He thought "good" names a simple property. A simple property cannot be defined by breaking it into parts. You can learn "yellow" by seeing yellow things, but you cannot define yellow by listing smaller color-pieces. Moore thought goodness works somewhat like that.

Moore was also a consequentialist. Consequentialism says that the right action is the one whose results are best overall. But he was not a simple pleasure-only utilitarian. He thought valuable states of affairs include friendship, love, beauty, knowledge, and the appreciation of good things. A world with deep friendship and real beauty can be better than a world with the same amount of pleasure but none of those goods.

Key Ideas With Examples

• Common-sense realism: Some ordinary claims are more certain than the arguments used to deny them. Example: if a theory says no material objects exist, Moore says we have stronger reason to believe "this is my hand."

• Analysis: Philosophy should separate questions and clarify meanings before building theories. Example: "What does good mean?" is different from "Which things are good?" A theory can fail by mixing those up.

• Anti-idealism: Moore rejected the claim that things exist only as parts of experience or mind. Example: seeing a tree is not the same thing as creating the tree by seeing it.

• "Here is one hand": Moore's compact proof that external objects exist. If he can know that one hand is here and another hand is there, then he can know that at least two things exist outside his mind.

• Open question argument: If someone says "good means pleasant," we can still ask, "Is pleasure good?" Because that question remains meaningful, Moore thinks the definition has not captured goodness.

• Naturalistic fallacy: The mistake of defining goodness as a natural feature. Example: "good means socially approved" fails because a society can approve of something cruel.

• Intrinsic good: Something good in itself, not merely as a tool. Moore thought friendship, beauty, and the appreciation of beauty can be intrinsically good.

Major Works

• Principia Ethica (1903): Moore's major ethics book. It argues that good cannot be defined as pleasure, desire, or any other natural property. It also says some things are intrinsically good, especially personal affection and the enjoyment of beauty.

• "The Refutation of Idealism" (1903): Moore's attack on the claim that reality depends on being experienced. The essay argues that idealists confuse consciousness with the object of consciousness.

• "A Defence of Common Sense" (1925): Moore lists ordinary propositions he thinks he knows, such as that he has a body and that the earth existed before his birth. The essay asks why a philosophy that denies these claims should be treated as more credible.

• "Proof of an External World" (1939): Moore gives the famous hand proof. It is short, but it became central to later debates about skepticism, proof, and what counts as knowing.

• Some Main Problems of Philosophy (1953): Based on Moore's lectures. It explains problems about perception, knowledge, and the external world in a patient style that shows his method at work.

Why It Matters

Moore helped set the tone for early analytic philosophy. His style was not flashy. He slowed arguments down, separated meanings, and asked whether a claim was actually clearer than the ordinary belief it was supposed to replace.

His common-sense philosophy changed debates about skepticism. Later philosophers did not all accept his hand proof, but they had to answer its challenge: why trust a skeptical argument more than the ordinary things it denies?

In ethics, Moore made metaethics central. Metaethics asks what moral words mean and what kind of facts moral facts would be. After Moore, a moral philosopher had to be clearer about whether they were defining "good," naming things that are good, or giving a rule for action.

Moore also widened consequentialism. He agreed that results matter, but he denied that pleasure is the only valuable result. This helped make room for views where beauty, friendship, knowledge, and character matter as parts of a good life.

Proponents, Critics, and Opponents

Bertrand Russell was deeply affected by Moore's break from British idealism. Russell took the turn in a more logical and mathematical direction, but Moore helped clear the path.

Ludwig Wittgenstein later focused on Moore's common-sense claims in On Certainty. He did not simply repeat Moore. He asked what role such claims play in our language and practices.

J. L. Austin inherited Moore's respect for ordinary distinctions, though Austin made ordinary-language philosophy more detailed and systematic. He cared about how words actually work in everyday speech.

Moore criticized classical utilitarianism when it defined good as pleasure. He still kept a consequentialist shape: right action depends on producing the best overall results. The difference is that Moore counted more goods than pleasure.

Later ethical naturalists and virtue ethicists pushed back against Moore's non-naturalism. Philippa Foot, for example, rejected the idea that goodness floats apart from human life, needs, virtues, and practical reasons. Many later philosophers also argued that the open question argument shows something important about moral language but does not prove that goodness is a special non-natural property.

Related Pages

• Analytic Philosophy
• Bertrand Russell
• Ludwig Wittgenstein
• J. L. Austin
• Utilitarianism
• Gottlob Frege
• Philippa Foot