T. M. Scanlon

Quick Facts

• Full name: Thomas Michael Scanlon
• Common names: T. M. Scanlon, Tim Scanlon
• Born: June 28, 1940, in Indianapolis, Indiana
• Main fields: ethics, political philosophy, analytic philosophy
• Academic home: Princeton, then Harvard
• Best known for: contractualism, reasons, blame, equality, and the phrase "what we owe to each other"
• Central book: What We Owe to Each Other (1998)

The Big Question

How can moral rules be more than personal taste, social habit, or a calculation of total happiness?

Scanlon's answer is that morality begins with justification to other people. If my action affects you, I should be able to explain the principle behind it in terms you could not reasonably reject. The test is not "Did I get the best result for the crowd?" It is "Could each person affected live with this rule as a rule for all of us?"

In One Minute

T. M. Scanlon is an American philosopher who gave one of the most influential recent accounts of contractualism. Contractualism says that an action is wrong when the principle allowing it could be reasonably rejected by people who are trying to find fair rules for living with one another.

This is not an actual contract. Nobody signs anything. The "contract" is a thought test for moral justification. It asks whether a rule respects each person as someone whose complaint has to be answered.

The title phrase "what we owe to each other" names the part of morality about duties between persons: keeping promises, avoiding harm, treating people fairly, giving reasons, and not using others as tools. Scanlon also wrote important work on value, blame, responsibility, tolerance, free expression, inequality, and the reality of reasons.

What They Taught

Scanlon taught that morality is a matter of justifiability to persons. To ask whether an action is wrong, we should ask what general principle would permit it. Then we ask whether any affected person could reasonably reject that principle.

A principle is a rule for conduct, not a one-time excuse. "It is fine for me to lie whenever it helps me" is a principle. "People may break promises when keeping them would cause a tiny inconvenience" is another. Scanlon thinks moral thought should test rules like these from the standpoint of everyone who must live under them.

The word "reasonable" matters. A person can reject a rule out of selfishness, fear, confusion, or spite. That kind of rejection does not settle the issue. A reasonable rejection points to a burden others should take seriously: serious harm, unfair risk, humiliation, coercion, betrayal, or being forced to carry a cost for someone else's convenience.

This makes Scanlon different from simple utilitarianism. A utilitarian view usually asks which action produces the best total balance of happiness over suffering. Scanlon thinks that can miss the moral shape of a case. It would be wrong to seriously injure one innocent person just to give millions of people a small entertainment benefit. The many people have reasons, but the one person has a complaint that is much stronger.

Scanlon also made reasons central. A reason is a consideration that counts in favor of an action, belief, feeling, or response. The fact that someone is in pain is a reason to help. The fact that a promise led someone to rely on you is a reason to keep it. In Being Realistic about Reasons, Scanlon argues that truths about reasons are real. They are not just reports of what we desire or what society happens to approve.

His later work on blame keeps the same interpersonal focus. Blame is not mainly a private wish that someone suffer. It is a change in a relationship after a person shows disregard for what others could reasonably demand. If a friend betrays your confidence, the point is not only that a bad result occurred. The betrayal shows something about how that friend treated your standing.

Key Ideas With Examples

• Contractualism: the view that wrong actions are ruled out by principles no one could reasonably reject. If a rule lets drivers ignore pedestrians whenever they are in a hurry, pedestrians can reasonably reject it because it exposes them to grave danger for minor convenience.
• Reasonable rejection: a complaint strong enough to count in fair moral reasoning. "I dislike this rule because it stops me from exploiting you" is not reasonable. "This rule makes me bear a serious risk for your small gain" can be reasonable.
• What we owe to each other: the part of morality about duties between persons. It covers things like not lying, not harming, keeping promises, and giving others a fair basis for trust.
• Generic reasons: the kinds of reasons people generally have under a rule. We do not need to know exactly who will be hurt by a reckless policy. We can ask what reasons any person in that position would have to reject it.
• Individual complaints: Scanlon usually tests burdens person by person. This resists adding up many tiny benefits to outweigh one person's severe loss.
• Reasons fundamentalism: Scanlon's view that reasons are basic in ethics. A reason is not just a desire. Even if I do not want to apologize, the fact that I wronged you gives me a reason to do it.
• Value: to value something is to see reasons to respond to it in certain ways. Valuing a person gives reasons to protect, respect, listen, and avoid treating that person as a tool.
• Blame: a relationship response to faulty regard. If someone lies to you, blame can mean trusting them less, demanding an explanation, or changing the friendship.

Major Works

• "Contractualism and Utilitarianism" (1982): the essay that introduced the core contrast between Scanlon's moral contractualism and outcome-maximizing ethics.
• What We Owe to Each Other (1998): the main statement of his view. It explains reasons, value, well-being, promises, and the test of principles no one could reasonably reject.
• The Difficulty of Tolerance (2003): essays on political philosophy, including free expression, rights, human rights, punishment, equality, and why just institutions cannot simply override rights for better results.
• Moral Dimensions: Permissibility, Meaning, Blame (2008): separates whether an act is permitted from what the act means in a relationship. It develops his influential account of blame.
• Being Realistic about Reasons (2014): defends the idea that there are truths about reasons. Scanlon argues that this need not require strange nonphysical objects or a mysterious moral sense.
• Why Does Inequality Matter? (2018): asks why inequality is objectionable. Scanlon gives several answers, including unequal status, unfair opportunity, political domination, and unjust income-generating institutions.
• Morality and Responsibility (2025): a collection of essays on contractualism, wrongness, blame, responsibility, desert, choice, and replies to other philosophers.

Why It Matters

Scanlon gives moral philosophy a clear test that is not just "maximize good results" and not just "follow a command." His question is interpersonal: can this rule be justified to each person affected by it?

That makes his work useful for thinking about rights, promises, public policy, punishment, inequality, and ordinary relationships. It explains why a person's complaint can matter even when ignoring it would make many others slightly better off. It also helped make reasons a central topic in contemporary ethics.

Proponents, Critics, and Opponents

Scanlon's view is often read near Immanuel Kant, because both connect morality with respect for persons and universal justification. Scanlon is also close to John Rawls, but their projects differ. Rawls asks what principles should organize a just society. Scanlon asks what principles of conduct people could justify to one another.

Thomas Nagel shares Scanlon's concern with impartial reasons and justification. Derek Parfit treated Scanlonian contractualism as one of the central modern theories of moral reasons, while also arguing that the best forms of Kantian ethics, rule consequentialism, and contractualism may converge.

Critics press several worries. Consequentialists ask whether Scanlon gives enough weight to numbers when many people are affected. Other critics ask whether "reasonable rejection" already smuggles in the moral judgments it is supposed to explain. A further challenge concerns beings who cannot bargain or answer back, such as animals, infants, and future people.

Scanlon's strongest reply is to hold onto the idea of justification to each person. Morality is not just about making the world contain more good things. It is also about whether our principles can be defended to those who must live with their costs.

Related Pages

• Immanuel Kant
• John Rawls
• Derek Parfit
• Thomas Nagel
• Christine Korsgaard
• Political Liberalism
• Utilitarianism